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O
ne of the hallmarks of human 
nature is our remarkably 
ﬂ  exible behaviour, especially 
in the social domain, which is perhaps 
also a major reason for our relative 
evolutionary success. Our social skills 
are already being honed in childhood 
and early adolescence, when we quickly 
become very adept at forming and 
breaking alliances within and between 
groups and spend much of our time 
engaged in complex social interactions. 
At best, these interactions enrich 
our society; at worst, they become 
‘Machiavellian’ and exploitative. While 
science might appear removed from 
such politics, many scientists would 
probably agree that science is in fact 
a social enterprise, sharing many 
characteristics with other human 
pursuits, and that any claim to greater 
scientiﬁ  c truth can only be accorded 
over decades, even centuries.
 I have always been fascinated by 
social intelligence, particularly of 
the ‘Machiavellian’ kind, and found 
myself wondering at the start of my 
doctoral research how one might use 
neuroimaging to study social 
intelligence in the human brain. I was 
also interested by the fact that some 
of this ﬂ  exible behaviour is shared 
with other primates such as chimps, 
bonobos, and even monkeys, who 
also spend inordinate amounts of 
time in social interactions, working 
out social hierarchies. However, it 
was not immediately obvious how one 
might go about designing experiments 
that would address these somewhat 
intangible issues of social behaviour. 
Trawling the scientiﬁ  c literature, I 
came across the concept of reversal 
learning. While it is obviously 
important that we can learn arbitrary 
associations between stimuli and 
actions, it is also extremely important 
that we can relatively easily break these 
associations and learn others. If we 
learn that choosing a certain object 
leads to a reward, it would be rather 
maladaptive to keep choosing this 
object when it was no longer associated 
with a reward but, say, a punishment 
instead. In order to accommodate 
complex behaviour, we need to be 
able to adapt or reverse the learning 
patterns when things change.
For a long time, it was thought that 
complex behaviour depended crucially 
on the prefrontal cortex of the brain, 
but it was not clear which parts were 
important for reversal learning. This 
was investigated in a classic paper by 
the eminent neuroscientists Susan 
Iversen and Mortimer Mishkin (1970), 
who studied lesions in monkeys, with 
elegant and important results. The 
authors lesioned discrete parts of the 
prefrontal cortex in different monkeys 
and showed convincingly that these 
lesions had differential effects on the 
animals’ ability to reverse rewarding 
associations in an object reversal task. 
When the inferior prefrontal convexity 
and parts of the lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex (which is the ventral part of the 
prefrontal cortex over the orbits) (see 
Figure 1) were lesioned, the monkeys 
became signiﬁ  cantly impaired with 
respect to object reversal learning. 
Speciﬁ  cally, they continued to respond 
much longer than controls to an 
object that was no longer rewarded on 
the ﬁ  rst reversal trial. 
This was not the case for monkeys 
who had had the medial parts of 
the orbitofrontal cortex lesioned. 
These monkeys were not completely 
unaffected by the lesion, but showed 
moderate impairment on all but 
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the ﬁ  rst of the object discrimination 
reversals. Furthermore, they had 
moderate difﬁ  culty withholding 
response between trials on an auditory 
differentiation task. These results 
strongly suggested a differential role 
for the lateral and medial parts of the 
orbitofrontal cortex.
Although the paper was not 
published in a high-proﬁ  le journal, this 
elegant and very signiﬁ  cant result has 
had a huge inﬂ  uence on subsequent 
research. The paper, like many other 
great papers, was ahead of its time, 
and it took almost a decade before 
the citations started to pick up (at last 
online count, on February 1, 2004, 
of the ISI database, the paper had 
generated 229 citations since 1981). 
Iversen and Mishkin (1970) 
persuasively demonstrated the 
importance of the orbitofrontal 
cortex in reversal learning, and other 
studies have since extended this result 
in nonhuman primates. One study 
demonstrated that single neurons 
in the macaque orbitofrontal cortex 
change their responses to a visual cue 
after a single trial in which the reward 
association of the visual cue is reversed 
(Thorpe et al. 1983). Another lesion 
study in marmosets by Dias et al. (1996) 
found that the orbitofrontal cortex 
is essential for the performance of 
emotion-related reversal learning tasks. 
There was also some evidence 
that humans with lesions to the 
orbitofrontal cortex have problems 
with reversal learning, but the lesions, 
caused by neurological insult, were not 
very clean or focal (Rolls et al. 1994). 
In addition, it had also become clear 
that lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex 
were associated with impairments 
in emotional and social behaviour, 
characterised by disinhibition, social 
inappropriateness, and irresponsibility 
(Anderson et al. 1999).
These interesting but nonconclusive 
results in humans spurred us on to use 
neuroimaging on a modiﬁ  ed version 
of a probabilistic reversal learning 
task designed by Julia Hornak and 
John O’Doherty (Hornak et al. 2004), 
whose preliminary data suggested that 
patients with surgical lesions to the 
orbitofrontal cortex were impaired. 
The subjects’ task was to determine, 
by trial and error, which of two stimuli 
was the more proﬁ  table to choose and 
to keep track of this, reversing their 
choice when a reversal occurred. By 
design, the actual reversal event was not 
easy to determine, since ‘money’ could 
be won or lost on both stimuli, but a 
choice of the rewarding stimulus would 
in general give larger rewards and 
smaller punishments. The converse was 
true of the punishing stimulus; losing 
a large amount of money would often 
(but not always) signal that a reversal 
had occurred.
We used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging to show that 
dissociable activity in the medial 
orbitofrontal cortex was correlated 
with the magnitude of the monetary 
gains received, while activity in the 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex was 
correlated with the monetary losses 
incurred (O’Doherty et al. 2001). This 
dissociation between the functions 
of medial and lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex seemed to mirror Iversen 
and Mishkin’s initial dissociation 
in monkeys, in which the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex was linked, in 
both cases, to the reversal trials. 
However, owing to the probabilistic 
nature of the task, in which receiving 
a monetary punishment did not always 
signal reversal, our imaging study did 
not reveal the cortical localisation 
of reversal trials. In addition, our 
task used money as the secondary 
reinforcer, which might be a powerful 
inﬂ  uence on humans but has little 
biological relevance for other animals, 
and certainly none in the social domain 
that I was interested in.
One way to solve these problems was 
to use facial expressions rather than 
money as the reinforcing stimuli. This 
made sense, given that the key to social 
intelligence is the ability to detect 
subtle changes in communication 
and act upon these changes rapidly 
as they occur. Such changes in social 
behaviour are often based on facial 
expression and come so naturally to 
humans (and are in place so early 
in child development) that some 
might argue that this functionality is 
essentially innate. However, our human 
social behaviour is sufﬁ  ciently ﬂ  exible 
that we can easily learn to adapt our 
behaviour to most facial expressions. 
For example, other people’s neutral 
expressions do not normally indicate 
that our behaviour should change, but 
it is easy to think of social contexts in 
which a neutral expression does indeed 
imply that our current behaviour is 
inappropriate and should change. 
I designed a reversal task in which the 
subject’s overall goal was to keep track 
of the mood of two people presented 
in a pair and, as much as possible, to 
select the ‘happy’ person, who would 
then smile. Over time, the person with 
the ‘happy’ mood (who would smile 
when selected), changed his/her 
mood to ‘angry’. This person thus 
no longer smiled when selected, but 
instead changed to a facial expression 
that signalled that he/she should no 
longer be selected. In the main reversal 
task, the facial expression used to 
cue reversal was an angry expression 
(the most natural facial expression 
to cue reversal), while in the second, 
control, version of the reversal task, a 
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Figure 1. Reversal Learning and the Orbitofrontal Cortex
(A) Lateral and ventral views of the surface reconstructions of the lateral and medial 
orbitofrontal cortex lesions in monkeys (adapted from Iversen and Mishkin 1970), with 
the former monkeys having difﬁ  culty with the reversal task.
(B) A ventral view of the human brain, with the cerebellum removed. Red activations in 
the lateral orbitofrontal cortex indicate the maximal activation for reversal compared to 
stable acquisition events. Blue activations indicate the main effects of facial expression 
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neutral expression was used. By using 
two different reversal tasks in which 
different facial expressions signalled that 
behaviour must change, we were able 
to determine which brain areas were 
speciﬁ  c to general reversal learning, 
rather than just to reversal following a 
particular expression, such as anger.
We used functional magnetic 
resonance imaging to show that the 
ability to change behaviour based on 
facial expression is not reﬂ  ected in 
the activity of the fusiform face area 
(which invariably appears to reﬂ  ect 
only identity and not valence), but that 
general reversal learning is speciﬁ  cally 
correlated with activity in the lateral 
orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate/
paracingulate cortices (as well as other 
brain areas, including the ventral 
striatum and the inferior precentral 
sulcus) (Kringelbach and Rolls 2003). 
This result conﬁ  rmed and extended 
the results from Iversen and Mishkin’s 
original paper. Further conﬁ  rmation 
came from the neuropsychological 
testing, carried out by Julia Hornak on 
human patients with surgical lesions to 
the orbitofrontal cortex, which showed 
that bilateral (but not unilateral) 
lesions to the lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex produce signiﬁ  cant impairments 
in reversal learning (Hornak et al. 
2004). Yet, as always, these results 
are not conclusive and raise many 
new issues. It is, for instance, not 
presently clear what other areas of 
the brain are necessary and sufﬁ  cient 
for reversal learning. Among the 
other brain areas we found relating 
to general reversal learning in our 
study, the ventral striatum is, for 
instance, an obvious candidate (Cools 
et al. 2002). In addition, functional 
magnetic resonance imaging is 
essentially a correlative technique, 
with poor temporal information, 
which makes it very difﬁ  cult to infer 
causal relations between brain regions. 
Thus, further investigations, e.g., with 
magnetoencephalography, will still be 
required to gain temporal information 
on the milliseconds scale. I take heart 
from a friend, a very distinguished 
scientist, who states that the price for 
having spent a lifetime in cutting-edge 
research is that 99% of his (and other 
scientists’) research is wrong—perhaps 
not completely wrong, but certainly 
wrong in the details. I would like to 
think that the original result from the 
Iversen and Mishkin paper is among 
the rare 1%, but the trouble with such 
foresight is that it lacks the vantage 
point of true hindsight.
In his masterpiece, The Prince, 
Niccolò Machiavelli offers a rather 
pessimistic view on human nature, 
in which ‘love is held by a chain of 
obligation which, since men are bad, 
is broken at every opportunity for 
personal gain’. It may be that our 
capacity for rapid reversal learning is 
sometimes used for less than noble 
pursuits, both in science and in 
interpersonal relations in general, 
but we would be in real trouble if we 
couldn’t learn to change.  
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